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1 Pub. L. 103-66, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).  See N. Harl,
"Selected Provisions From the Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1993 (H.R. 2264)," 4 Agric. L. Dig. 125 (1993).
2 See Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, n. 1 supra, § 13226
(hereinafter RRA).
3 RRA, § 13226(a), amending I.R.C. § 108(e).
4 RRA, § 13150(b), amending I.R.C. § 108(c).
5 RRA, § 13226(b), amending I.R.C. § 108(b)(2)(C).
6 Id.
7 See ns. 29-36 infra.
8 See I.R.C. §§, 108(a)(1)(C), 108(g).  See also 4 Harl,
Agricultural Law § 39.03[6] (1993).
9 I.R.C. § 61(a)(12).
10 I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(A).
11 I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(B).
12 I.R.C. § 108(A)(1)(C).
13 I.R.C. § 108(A)(1)(D).
14 I.R.C. § 108(e)(5).
15 I.R.C. § 108(g)(2)(A).
16 I.R.C. § 108(g)(1)(B).
17 I.R.C. § 108(g)(2).
18 I.R.C. § 108(g)(3).
19 I.R.C. § 108(g)(3)(A).
20 See n. 1 supra.
21 RRA, § 13226(b).
22 RRA, § 13226(b), amending I.R.C. § 108(b)(2)(C).
23 I.R.C. § 53(a).
24 I.R.C. § 53(b).
25 RRA, § 13226(b)(4).
26 I.R.C. § 469.
27 I.R.C. § 469(a).
28 I.R.C. § 469(b).
29 I.R.C. § 469(g).
30 RRA, § 13226(b)(4).
31 I.R.C. § 108(b)(2)(A).
32 I.R.C. § 108(b)(2)(B).
33 I.R.C. § 108(b)(2)(C).
34 I.R.C. § 108(b)(2)(D).
35 I.R.C. § 108(b)(2)(F).
36 I.R.C. § 108(b)(2)(G).
37 I.R.C. § 108(g)(3)(C).
38 I.R.C. § 1017(b)(4).  The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993
failed to amend I.R.C. § 1017(b)(4)(A) to refer to "section
(b)(2)(E) of section 108" rather than "section (b)(2)(D) of
section 108."  Presumably, that will be included in technical
corrections legislation.
39 See I.R.C. § 1017(b)(2) (rule limiting reduction of basis to debt
on property applies only where taxpayer is insolvent or in
bankruptcy).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL
CLAIMS. The debtor had leased, under a 50 year lease,
7.7 acres of land to the debtor’s son for rent of $10 per year.
The son operated a nursery on the land for several years but
liquidated the business prior to the bankruptcy filing. The
son was unable to provide competent evidence of the
payment of any rent and the court held that the lease had
been breached by the son. The trustee had sold the property
including the leasehold and paid the son $33,000 in
exchange for a release of the son’s leasehold interest. The
son sought further claims for the leasehold interest. The
court denied the claim because the son produced no
competent evidence of the leasehold value, the lease had
been breached and the son had already received a substantial
sum for the leasehold. In re Aube, 158 B.R. 567 (Bankr.
D. R.I. 1993).
DISCHARGE. The IRS had issued a deficiency
assessment against the debtor for additional 1987 taxes
resulting from understatement of income on the debtor’s
federal income tax return. The debtor did not amend the
1987 state income tax return but the state filed a claim for
additional taxes based upon the IRS assessment. The debtor
argued that the state taxes were dischargeable because no
return was required to be filed within three years before the
bankruptcy petition. The court held that the statute, Ga.
Code § 48-7-82(e)(1), clearly required the debtor to file a
return after the debtor’s net income is changed by a
determination of the IRS; therefore, because the debtor did
not file an amended return, the taxes were nondischargeable.
In re Jones, 158 B.R. 535 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993).
EXEMPTIONS-ALM § 13.03[3].*
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The court held that the debtor
could not avoid a judgment lien on the debtor’s homestead
because, under Colorado law, judgment liens cannot attach
to homesteads. In re Shaff, 158 B.R. 224 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1993).
CONVERSION OF ASSETS. Prior to filing for
bankruptcy, the debtor sold some non-exempt real property
and used the proceeds to pay off the mortgage on the
property and to purchase some exempt annuities. The debtor
testified that the purpose for purchasing the annuities was to
provide income and to shield the proceeds from creditors.
The court held that the conversion was impermissable pre-
bankruptcy planning and disallowed the exemptions because
the debtor had no idea when the annuities would provide
income, the debtor consulted with an attorney before
making the conversion and the debtor knew the bankruptcy
consequences of the transactions. In re Mackey, 158 B.R.
509 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
HOMESTEAD.  Under a divorce decree, the debtor’s
homestead was to be sold with the proceeds divided
between the parties. The house remained unsold at the time
of the bankruptcy. The debtor moved out of the house and
into an apartment in another city just prior to filing
bankruptcy but the debtor’s son lived in the house at the
time of the bankruptcy filing. The debtor stated that the
debtor would return to the house only if the debtor could
find a job in that city. The court denied the homestead
exemption because the debtor had abandoned the house
without intent to return. In re Mackey, 158 B.R. 509
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
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VALUATION. The debtor’s estate included a 57 acre
separate parcel of pasture land located next to a road. The
debtor’s appraiser valued the land according to the debtor’s
present and planned use as pasture. A creditor had a junior
security interest in the land which would be totally
unsecured if the land were valued as pasture land. The
creditor’s appraiser valued the land according to its use as a
development site for rural residences. With this value, the
creditor would be partially secured. The debtor argued that
the land should be valued as pasture land because the debtor
was going to retain the land and intended to keep the land as
pasture. The court held that both valuations were correct
under their separate assumptions, but that the land would be
valued at its highest and best use value as residential
development property because using the lesser value merely
because of the desires of the debtor was unfair to the
creditor and other unsecured creditors. The court reasoned
that because the debtor was receiving the benefits of
bankruptcy, the debtor had a duty to provide the highest
return to the creditors from valuing property at its highest
and best use. In re Sherman, 157 B.R. 987 (Bankr. E.D.
Tex. 1993).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
E L I G I B L I T Y . The debtor was a family farm
partnership which owed a nonrecourse debt to a bank in
receivership to the F.D.I.C. The nonrecourse debt exceeded
$1.5 million and the F.D.I.C. moved to dismiss the case
because the debtor was not eligible for Chapter 12. The
debtor argued that nonrecourse debt should not be included
in the partnership‘s aggregate debts because the partnership
was not personally liable on the debt. The court held that the
legislative history and Sections 101(12), 101(5) indicated
that Section 109(f) was to be broadly interpreted to include
nonrecourse debts in the amount of the debtor’s aggregate
debts for purposes of eligibility for Chapter 12 and
dismissed the case. Lindsey, Stephenson & Lindsey v.
F.D.I.C., 158 B.R. 75 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
PLAN. The debtors obtained possession of 462 acres of
farmland by quitclaim deed from the owner in satisfaction
of a debt owed to the debtors by the owner. The property
was subject to superior liens held by the FmHA which
obtained foreclosure judgments against the property. Under
the foreclosure judgments, the debtors retained only a right
to redeem the property for the foreclosure judgment amount.
The debtors’ plan proposed to pay the FmHA the current
value of the property over 35 years at 8 percent. The
debtors’ main source of income was from the cash rental of
the property, with some additional income from the wife’s
income as a teacher and painter. The husband was a
carpenter but had not worked much in the past year. The
debtors’ plan provided for funding from the cash rent of
most of the land, the debtors’ nonfarm income and income
from the raising of sheep or cattle. The court held that the
plan could not be confirmed and the case was dismissed.
The court held that the debtors’ income projections were too
speculative given their poor income history and the failure
of the debtors to demonstrate the availability of funding for
the cattle or sheep operation. In addition, the court held that
the debtors could not modify the rights of the FmHA
because the debtors only had a right of redemption in the
property. In re Kuether, 158 B.R. 151 (Bankr. D. N.D.
1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
CLAIMS. The debtors listed a priority debt to the IRS
on their schedules and the IRS was given notice of the
confirmation hearing. The confirmation hearing occurred
and the plan was confirmed before the bar date for claims
had passed. After the confirmation but before the claims bar
date, the IRS filed a proof of claim substantially above the
claim listed by the debtors. The court held that the
confirmation of the plan did not bar the filing of additional
claims prior to the claims bar date. In re Grogan, 158 B.R.
197 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1993).
PASSIVE INVESTMENT LOSSES. The debtor filed
for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on December 5, 1990. During
1990, the debtors sold for gain passive investment property
for which the debtors had substantial amount of carryover
passive investment losses. The bankruptcy trustee sought a
determination that the passive investment loss carryover
amount belonged to the estate and not to the debtors. The
court held that because I.R.C. § 1398(g) did not specifically
mention passive investment losses and the Secretary of the
Treasury had not issued regulations providing for passing of
passive investment losses to a bankruptcy estate, the passive
investment losses remained with the debtors. The trustee
also argued that the disposition of some of the passive
investment properties converted, under I.R.C. §
469(g)(1)(ii), the passive investment losses into regular net
operating losses which pass to the estate under I.R.C. §
1398(g). The court rejected this argument because the
determination of the character of the losses is made as of the
first day of the taxable year, January 1, 1990, which
occurred prior to the disposition of the property. In addition,
the court ruled that I.R.C. § 469(g)(1)(ii) converted only the
excess passive losses into net operating losses upon
disposition of passive investment property, and in this case,
no excess losses existed because the gain exceeded the
losses. In re Rueter, 158 B.R. 163 (N.D. Cal. 1993).  Note:
the IRS has issued proposed regulations which include
passive activity losses in the list of tax items which pass to
the bankruptcy estate in Chapters 7 and 11 (see Vol. 3,
Agric. L. Dig., p. 191). Once these regulations are in effect,
debtor should make the election for a short taxable year
ending on the day before the bankruptcy filing in order to
retain any tax attributes which arose during that short year.
POST-PETITION INTEREST. The debtor had filed
income tax returns for 1979 and 1980 but had not paid the
taxes claimed on the forms. The debtor filed in Chapter 11
in 1984 and the IRS filed claims for 1979 and 1980 taxes
substantially higher than reported by the debtor because the
IRS disallowed losses from some tax straddle transactions.
In 1991, the IRS finally agreed that the original returns were
correct and amended its claim to the amount of taxes
claimed on the returns plus post-petition interest. The debtor
argued that the interest should not have run on the claim
until it was determined by the agreement with the IRS. The
court held that the post-petition interest was allowed. In re
Turgeon, 158 B.R. 328 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1993).
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CONTRACTS
POULTRY RAISING CONTRACTS. The plaintiff
entered into a series of annual contracts with the defendant
to raise turkeys supplied by the defendant. The plaintiff
sought damages for misrepresentation and breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability. The defendant argued
that the claim of misrepresentation as to the weight and
prices of the live and dead birds involved and as to the
promise to not change the contracts from year to year were
barred by the three-year statute of limitations. The court
held that the alleged misrepresentations as to the weights
and prices of turkeys delivered involved a continuous course
of conduct for which the statute of limitation applied to each
incident. The court also held that the other claim of
misrepresentation was time-barred because the plaintiff
knew about contract changes when the second annual
contract was changed, more than three years before the
filing of the suit.  The plaintiff also alleged that the
defendant breached the implied warranty of merchantability
in that the birds delivered were sickly and of general inferior
quality. The defendant argued that the plaintiff failed to
provide timely notice of the claim after delivery. The court
held that the plaintiff had shown sufficient fact allegations
of actual notice of the defendant about the claim to deny
summary judgment for the defendant. The defendant also
argued that a limitation of 30 days for claims in each
contract barred the plaintiff's claim. The court held that
contract provision did not affect claims for implied breach
of warranty of merchantability. Jackson v. Swift-Eckrich,
830 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Ark. 1993).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
FUNGICIDES-ALM § 2.04.* A squash farmer applied a
fungicide manufactured by the defendant directly on
harvested squash in violation of the warning instructions
with the fungicide. The plaintiffs were employees of a
produce broker which purchased the mistreated squash. The
employees were injured when they handled the squash and
the fungicide residue became airborne. The plaintiffs sued
the defendant for failure to warn about the dangers of the
fungicide when misapplied by farmers. The defendant
argued that it had no duty to warn because the plaintiffs
were not the users of the product and that warning such
ultimate users was not possible. The court held that the issue
of the ability of the defendant to warn the plaintiffs was a
issue of fact for the jury. The defendant also argued that the
failure to warn action was pre-empted by FIFRA. The court
held that the action was not pre-empted because FIFRA
allowed the states to require additional warnings to persons
who were not the primary users of the fungicide. Macrie v.
SDS Biotech Corp., 630 A.2d 805 (N.J. Super. A.D.
1993).
GRAZING PERMITS-ALM § 11.05[3].* The plaintiff
held a permit to graze 201 cattle on the Barranca allotment
of the Cibola National Forest. After several years of range
evaluations, the Forest Service reduced the permit to allow
only 112 cattle to be grazed on the allotment. The plaintiff
argued that the reduction was arbitrary and capricious
because the trend for the range condition was improving.
The court held that the reduction could be based on the
current condition of the allotment and that the evaluations
demonstrated that the allotment condition was poor. The
plaintiff also argued that the Forest Service failed to conduct
a Takings Implication Assessment (TIA) as required by
Executive Order 12630. The court held that a TIA was not
required for reduction of grazing permits because the
plaintiff had no property right in the grazing permit which
could be taken by the government. McKinley v. U.S., 828
F. Supp. 888 (D. N.M. 1993).
MEAT AND POULTRY PRODUCTS. The FSIS has
withdrawn previous proposed regulations and reissued the
proposed regulations requiring safe handling instructions on
all raw meat and poultry product labeling. 58 Fed. Reg.
58918 (Nov. 4, 1993); 58 Fed. Reg. 58922 (Nov. 4, 1993).
NATIONAL FORESTS-ALM § 11.04.*  In 1964, the
plaintiffs purchased two parcels of land which are
surrounded by the Toiyabe National Forest. The plaintiffs
built two roads and a fire break on the forest land without
permission and ran two sets of water pipes over forest land
from one parcel to the other for irrigation purposes. The
Forest Service had new surveys made which demonstrated
that the roads and pipes were on Forest Service land. The
court held that under 16 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq., the plaintiffs
were entitled to an easement over the Forest Service’s road
because the plaintiffs’ use of the road required more
maintenance than the Forest Service otherwise provided for
the general public’s use of the road. The court also held that
the plaintiffs were liable for damages for the fire break and
other road built on Forest Service land. The court also
upheld the plaintiffs’ claim for a water easement as valid
under state law, subject to reasonable regulation by the
Forest Service. Adams v. U.S., 3 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir.
1993), aff’g in part and rev’g in part, 687 F. Supp. 1479
(D. Nev. 1988).
PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ACT-ALM § 9.05.*
The plaintiff entered into a series of annual contracts with
the defendant to raise turkeys supplied by the defendant.
The plaintiff filed a private action against the defendant for
violations of the Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA). The
action was allowed by PSA § 209 but the PSA did not
provide a limitations period for bringing such actions. The
court used the “state-borrowing” doctrine of Lampf v.
Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773(1991), which allows a court to
use a similar state or federal law as a statute of limitations.
The court held that the four-year statute of limitations in the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15b, would be
applicable to private actions for violations of the PSA
because both laws involved regulation of anticompetitive
trade practices.  Jackson v. Swift-Eckrich, 830 F. Supp.
486 (W.D. Ark. 1993).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT-ALM § 10.05[2].*  The plaintiffs were dealers in
perishable agricultural goods which sold produce to a
produce wholesaler. The wholesaler had granted by
assignment a security interest in its accounts receivable to
the defendant. The defendant collected on these accounts
receivable during a fourth month period during which
produce from the sellers was sold to the wholesaler without
payment. The defendant sought discovery of the sales
receipts and other evidence of the plaintiffs’ transaction
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with the wholesaler, arguing that the plaintiffs were not
eligible for PACA trust protection because the plaintiffs had
accepted, either by oral agreement or course of dealing,
payment for the produce more than 30 days after delivery.
The plaintiffs’ written bills stated that payment was to be
received within 10 days of delivery. The court held that
under Hull Co. v. Hauser’s Foods, Inc., 924 F.2d 777 (8th
Cir. 1991), such oral agreements and course of dealing
would not have any affect on the plaintiffs’ right to the
PACA trust protection because the written agreement
always was available to enforce the payment within the
PACA limit of 30 days. The court also held that the
defendant was liable for the PACA trust funds to the extent
that the defendant collected on the assigned accounts
receivable during the time the plaintiffs’ produce was
purchased. The court ruled that the defendant had not given
value for the accounts receivable on which it collected. The
court also held that the sale of  breaded cauliflower and
frozen cooked potatoes sprayed with oil were not perishable
agricultural products covered by PACA. The court did allow
PACA protection for frozen cooked potatoes which were
not sprayed with oil. A & J Produce Corp. v. CIT Group/
Factoring, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. N.Y. 1993).
PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAMS. The CCC has
adopted as final regulations governing the price support
program for grains and similarly handled commodities. The
changes primarily make the provisions more uniform for the
various commodities and remove obsolete provisions. 58
Fed. Reg. 58739 (Nov. 4, 1993).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES-ALM § 5.04[1].*
The decedent’s estate consisted of real and personal
property owned by the decedent and real and personal
property owned by the decedent and child as joint tenants.
The decedent had contributed all of the joint interest
property. The decedent’s child was the sole legatee of the
decedent’s probate estate and served as executor. The
executor sold a condominium owned by the decedent and
claimed the sale expenses as an administrative expense
deduction on the federal estate tax return. Under California
law, only probated property could be used to pay for estate
administrative expenses. The IRS ruled that the sale of the
condominium was necessary for the executor to obtain
proceeds to pay probate estate administrative expenses;
therefore, the costs of the sale were deductible
administrative expenses. Ltr. Rul. 9341002, June 15, 1993.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[4].* The
decedent had created a revocable trust which provided for a
residuary trust at the death of the decedent. The beneficiary
was the decedent’s sister with a charitable organization as
the remainder holder. The trust provided for distribution of
net income annually to the beneficiary and gave the trustee
the power to distribute principal for the beneficiary’s health,
maintenance and support. The beneficiary disclaimed the
right to principal distributions and the trustee obtained a
state court order amending the trust to provide for a unitrust
amount of 6.4 percent of the net fair market value of the
trust assets. The IRS ruled that the amendment was a
qualified amendment under I.R.C. § 2055(e)(3) and that the
amended trust remainder interest would qualify for the
charitable deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9341003, July 13, 1993.
GIFTS MADE WITHIN THREE YEARS OF
DEATH-ALM § 5.02[2].* Prior to becoming incapacitated,
the decedent executed a durable power of attorney naming
the decedent’s sons as attorneys-in-fact. The power of
attorney granted the sons broad powers to handle the
decedent’s affairs but did not specifically grant the sons the
power to make gifts. During the three years before the
decedent’s death and while the decedent was incapacitated,
the sons made several outright gifts to themselves and other
family members. The sons also created a trust for the
decedent which granted the sons, as trustees, broad powers
to distribute trust income and principal, including the power
to make gift distributions directly to themselves and others.
The IRS ruled that because the power of attorney did not
specifically grant the sons the authority to make gifts, the
gifts made were includible in the decedent’s gross estate. In
addition, the gifts made from the trust were also includible
in the decedent’s gross estate because the gifts were deemed
to be a revocation of the decedent’s right to revoke the trust.
Ltr. Rul. 9342003, June 30, 1993.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ACCOUNTING METHOD. The IRS has provided
guidance on the mark-to-market rules of accounting enacted
by the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, including which
taxpayers qualify as “dealers in securities” under the new
statute and which securities may be exempt from being
marked to market because the securities are “held for
investment.” The ruling also discusses how taxpayers may
change their accounting method to the new method. Rev.
Rul. 93-76, I.R.B. 1993-35.
ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX. The taxpayer
was a publicly held corporation in which no shareholder or
group of shareholders controlled more than 50 percent of the
stock. The corporation paid only a 30 percent dividend of its
current earnings, using the rest to increase salaries, to
redeem stock, to provide a reserve to pay employees during
slack times and to maintain a reserve for expansion. The
court held that the corporation was not liable for
accumulated earnings tax because the reserves were
necessary and the corporation paid a dividend and increased
employees’ salaries as required in a competitive and
personnel-intensive industry. Technalysis Corp. v.
Comm’r, 101 T.C. No. 27 (1993).
ANNUITIES-ALM § 6.04.* The taxpayer purchased a
nonparticipating, variable annuity contract which allowed
the taxpayer to transfer the premium amounts among
various investment options. The taxpayer also contracted
with an investment advisor to have the advisor make the
investment decisions for the annuity premiums. The
advisor’s fee was paid directly from the annuity. The IRS
ruled that the fee could not be claimed as an expense of the
annuity and deducted from the taxpayer’s gross income
from the annuity because the investment advisor performed
the services solely for the taxpayer’s benefit. Ltr. Rul.
9342053, July 28, 1993.
BAD DEBT DEDUCTION-ALM § 4.03[7].* The
taxpayers had invested in a company in which the main
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promoter was eventually convicted for fraud. In 1986, the
company filed for bankruptcy with the taxpayers’ receiving
stock in the reorganized company worth only 5 percent of
their lost investment. Although the bankruptcy plan
provided for additional payments to unsecured creditors, the
expected return was less than 5 cents on the dollar. The
convicted promoter also filed for bankruptcy and had a
substantial number of creditors, including more than 600
defrauded investors. The court ruled that the taxpayers were
eligible for a bad debt deduction in 1986 to the extent their
investment was not recovered in the bankruptcy case. Bubb
v. U.S., 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,572 (W.D. Pa.
1993).
C CORPORATIONS
CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS. A corporation
advanced funds to its sole shareholder at a time when the
corporation had earnings but paid no dividends. The
corporation did not list the advanced funds as a loan nor did
the corporation charge interest. The corporation also paid
the premiums on insurance policies on the life of the
shareholder. The court held that the payments were
constructive dividends. Boecking v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1993-497.
HOME OFFICE-ALM § 4.02[13].*  The taxpayer
operated a timber cutting business and used a room in the
residence for an office for the business. The court held that
the taxpayer was eligible for the deductions incurred with
the home office because the principal place of business was
the home office and not the forests in which the timber was
cut. For the same reasons, the taxpayer could also deduct the
costs of travel to the cutting sites and meals taken when
working overnight at the timber sites. Callison v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1993-500.
INSTALLMENT REPORTING-ALM § 6.03[1].* The
taxpayers purchased a condominium. On the date the sales
contract was signed, the taxpayers made a downpayment.
The contract provided that the taxpayers would not seek
specific performance or damages in excess of the amount
paid down on the contract. The Tax Court held that the
taxpayer could not take an imputed interest deduction for a
payment made on the contract six months later at the closing
because the closing was the actual sale date. The court held
that the taxpayers only purchased an option on the date the
contract was signed. The court ruled that it was required to
follow Williams v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1992-269, aff’d,
93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,422 (7th Cir. 1993). Lang
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-474.
INVESTMENT INTEREST-ALM § 4.03[12].* The
taxpayer was an employee of a C corporation and in order to
protect the taxpayer’s employment, the taxpayer purchased
all of the stock of the corporation. The taxpayer borrowed
all of the funds for the purchase. The IRS ruled that the
interest paid by the taxpayer was investment interest subject
to the I.R.C. § 163(d) limitation. Rev. Rul. 93-68, I.R.B.
1993-33, 4.
The court held that a taxpayer’s carryover of excess
investment interest deduction in subsequent taxable years
was not limited by the taxpayer’s taxable income in the
carryover years. Albritton v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-
490.
LETTER RULINGS. The IRS has announced that it
will issue advance rulings and determination letters on the
issue of whether a foreign limited liability company is
classified as a partnership for federal income tax purposes.
Rev. Procs. 93-44, 93-45, I.R.B. 1993-34, 14.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES. The taxpayer sold a
residence for cash and placed the proceeds in an escrow
account while attempting to find some replacement property
for a “three corner” exchange in order to make a tax-free
exchange of property. The court held that the transaction did
not qualify for tax-free exchange status because the taxpayer
had control over the proceeds while in the escrow account
since the taxpayer was able to change the conditions of the
escrow account. Klien v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-491.
M E T H A N O L . The IRS has ruled that methanol
produced with methane obtained from waste disposal sites is
not eligible for the alcohol fuels credit because the methanol
was not produced from natural gas. Rev. Rul. 93-67, I.R.B.
1993-33, 4.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. The IRS issued
untimely notices of deficiencies to the taxpayers which
resulted from disallowance of losses and deductions from a
partnership. The taxpayers obtained a court ruling that the
notices were untimely and that the taxpayers did not owe
any deficiency. The partnership had not filed a return for the
tax year involved and the IRS filed a Final Partnership
Administrative Adjustment disallowing the same
partnership losses and deductions. Because the FPAA was
not served on the taxpayers, the taxpayers elected to not
agree with the FPAA. The IRS filed new notices of
deficiencies against the taxpayers based on the FPAA
disallowance of the partnership items. The court held that
the second notice of deficiency was not barred because the
FPAA rules superseded the limitation on notices of
deficiencies involving the same tax years. Boyd v.
Comm’r, 101 T.C. No. 25 (1993).
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in October
1993, the weighted average is 7.61 percent with the
permissible range of 6.85 to 8.37 percent for purposes of
determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. §
412(c)(7).  Notice 93-53, I.R.B. 1993-34, 12.
RETURNS. The IRS has issued proposed regulations
removing all “nonpayroll” withheld taxes from reporting on
Form 941. 58 Fed. Reg. 58820 (Nov. 4, 1993).
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ONE CLASS OF STOCK. An S corporation distributed
the funds in its accumulated adjustments account to three
shareholders who contributed the money back to the
corporation in exchange for promissory notes. The notes
paid quarterly interest of the prime rate less 2 percent, with
a minimum of 4 percent and a maximum of 10 percent. The
interest payments were not contingent on the corporation’s
profits and the notes were not exchangable for stock. The
notes were subordinate to the corporation's other
obligations. The IRS ruled that the notes did not create a
second class of stock and the corporation could deduct the
interest payments made on the notes. Ltr. Rul. 9342019,
July 21, 1993.
SALE OF RESIDENCE-ALM § 6.03[2].* The
taxpayers sold their residence under a threat of levy from
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the IRS in order to pay a tax deficiency. The taxpayers
claimed that the IRS agent stated that if the taxpayers sold
their residence themselves, they would be eligible for the
gain exclusion of I.R.C. § 121 (the taxpayers were over the
age of 55). However, the taxpayers did not exclude the gain
from their reported taxable income for the year of the sale
because the taxpayers knew that they had not lived in the
house for the required three of the last five years. The
taxpayers later filed an amended return claiming the
exclusion of the gain and seeking a refund. The taxpayers
argued that the IRS should be estopped from denying the
exclusion because of the agent’s statements. The court held
that the IRS was not estopped because the taxpayers did not
reasonably rely on the statement and actually did not follow
the advice on their first return. The court also held that the
taxpayers did not suffer any detriment from the advice
because the taxpayers did not detrimentally change their
position because of the advice. If the taxpayers had not sold
their house, the IRS would have foreclosed on its lien and
sold the house anyway. Crain v. State of Maryland, 93-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,573 (W.D. Pa. 1993).
MORTGAGES
BORROWER’S RIGHTS. The plaintiffs had lost their
farmland to the defendant through foreclosure. The
defendant planned to sell the land in four parcels to third
parties and sent the plaintiffs notice of the terms of the sales
and informed the plaintiffs of their right to purchase the
property at those terms. The plaintiffs did not respond to the
notice and the property was sold to the third parties. The
plaintiffs argued that the notices were deficient because (1)
the defendant allowed two purchasers to take possession
before the closings, (2) two closing dates were extended,
and (3) one notice was internally inconsistent. The court
held that the changes did not make the notices insufficient
because the changes were normal occurrences in property
transactions and occurred after the plaintiffs’ right to
repurchase had expired. The court also held that the
inconsistency in the one notice was a minor typographical
error for which the plaintiffs did not seek clarification;
therefore, the inconsistency did not disqualify that notice.
Hunter v. Union State Bank, 505 N.W.2d 172 (Iowa
1993).
The plaintiffs were farmers who had granted mortgages
on their farm to the defendant and another bank. The
plaintiffs had filed for bankruptcy in October 1986 and in
March 1987, the bankruptcy trustee conveyed the farm to
the other mortgage holder which conveyed the farm to the
defendant which sold the farm to third parties. All this
occurred prior to the effective date of an amendment to
Minn. Stat. § 500.24(6)(f) which allowed debtors in
bankruptcy to have a right of first refusal for farm property
conveyed during the bankruptcy case. The plaintiffs argued
that because the transfer occurred after the bankruptcy
filing, the right of first refusal accrued to the plaintiffs
personally and not to the bankruptcy estate. The court held
that the amendments to the statute could not be applied
retroactively and denied the plaintiffs’ right of first refusal.
Wenner v. Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul, 505 N.W.2d
645 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
The defendants had mortgaged their farm to the plaintiff
bank which sought to foreclose the mortgage. The
defendants raised an affirmative defense that the plaintiff
had failed to comply with the borrower’s rights provisions
of the Farm Credit Act of 1971 as amended and the Food
Security Act of 1985. The court held that neither act
provided for a right of private action to enforce the
borrower’s rights provisions. The loan secured by the
mortgage had a variable interest rate and the defendant
claimed an affirmative defense that the plaintiff, the USDA
and the U.S. government conspired to destabilize the farm
economy and raise interest rates to make it impossible for
the defendants to make their loan payments. The court
rejected this defense because the defendants knew that
interests rates fluctuated and that increases on a variable
interest rate loan were foreseeable. Farm Credit Bank of
St. Louis v. Dorr, 620 N.E.2d 549 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993).
IPSO FACTO CLAUSE. The debtors granted a
security interest in farm property as security for an operating
loan for their dairy farm. The loan agreement contained an
“ipso facto” clause declaring the loan to be in default if the
debtors declared bankruptcy. The debtors filed for Chapter
12 bankruptcy and the plan was confirmed with the plan
providing that a default of the plan payments gave the
creditor the right to foreclose against the collateral. The
bankruptcy case was eventually dismissed for failure to
make plan payments and the creditor sought foreclosure
based on the bankruptcy filing and default on the plan
payments. The court held that the “ipso facto” clause was
ineffective to create a foreclosure right upon the filing for
bankruptcy because 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B) transferred all
the property to the bankruptcy estate. Similarly, the court
held that the dismissal of the bankruptcy case returned the
parties to the status just prior to the bankruptcy filing, when
no defaults had occurred; therefore, the creditor could not
use the plan payment defaults as a basis for foreclosure of
the lien. First Security Bank of Utah v. Creech, 858 P.2d
958 (Utah 1993).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
COMBINE-ALM § 1.02[4].* The plaintiff was injured
when the plaintiff was cleaning the auger of a combine
manufactured by the defendant.  The combine engine was
running but the auger was disengaged when the plaintiff
began cleaning it, but the plaintiff's uncle, unaware that the
plaintiff was cleaning the auger, engaged the power to the
auger and injured the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued the
defendant for, among other things, failure to warn. The
defendant sought summary judgment on this claim because
(1) the danger was open and obvious, (2) the plaintiff had
knowledge of the danger, and (3) the plaintiff was a
sophisticated user of the combine. The court held that the
open and obvious danger defense was not available in
Michigan because the defense was available only for simple
tools such as hammers. The court also denied the summary
judgment because a question of fact remained as to whether
the plaintiff had knowledge of the danger and because
farmers are not held to be sophisticated users of complex
farm machinery. Eschenburg v. Navistar Intern. Transp.






INFRINGEMENT. The plaintiff was an association of
angus cattle breeders and owned an “uncontestable”
registered trademark consisting of the word “Certified”
over a profile of a steer over the words “ANGUS BEEF.”
The defendant was a meat wholesaler and started a sales
campaign to sell meat from angus cattle not produced by a
member of the plaintiff. The defendant’s sales personnel
distributed price sheets which had the plaintiff’s trademark
on the bottom. The defendant claimed that the use of the
logo alone was a mistake and that the logo was to be used
for comparison purposes only. The plaintiff also used the
words “Certified Angus Beef” in its promotional materials
and the court held that the terms had trademark protection
because of the long standing association with the plaintiff's
products. The court granted the plaintiff a temporary
injunction against the defendant’s use of the logo and words
“Certified Angus Beef” because the defendant had failed to
take substantial action to correct the claimed mistake and
that any use of the terms involved could produce further
confusion. American Angus Ass’n v. Sysco Corp., 829 F.
Supp. 807 (W.D. N.C. 1992).
CITATION UPDATES
Est. of Maxwell v. Comm'r, 3 F.3d 591 (2d Cir.
1993), aff’g, 98 T.C. 594 (1992) (transfer with retained
interest), see p. 153 supra.
The Agricultural Law Press announces
its newest publication with a special offer:
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to commemorate the assumption of
the publication of the Manual by the Agricultural Law
Press, the Manual is offered to new subscribers at $115,
including at no extra charge updates published within
five months after purchase. Updates are published every
four months to keep the Manual current with the latest
developments. After the first free update, additional updates
will be billed at $35 each in 1993 and 1994.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$6.35 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
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